Senegal has long been regarded as one of West Africa’s most stable democracies and more credible sovereign borrowers. Its institutions, infrastructure investments and record of peaceful political transitions gave the country considerable standing among international development partners.
That reputation has now been severely tested by the discovery that Senegal’s public debt and fiscal deficits were substantially higher than the figures previously presented to its citizens, investors and the International Monetary Fund.
The controversy is popularly described as Senegal’s “hidden debt” crisis. However, the issue is more accurately understood as a case of serious fiscal-data misreporting, incomplete debt disclosure and weaknesses in public financial management.
It is not merely a disagreement between the Government of Senegal and the IMF. It is a national accountability issue with profound implications for Senegal’s taxpayers, development prospects, financial institutions and future generations.
What are the established facts?
Following the election of President Bassirou Diomaye Faye in March 2024 and his assumption of office in April 2024, the new administration initiated a review of the public finances inherited from the government of former President Macky Sall.
Preliminary findings were examined by Senegal’s General Inspectorate of Finance and later reviewed by the Court of Auditors.
The Court of Auditors’ report, published in February 2025, found substantial discrepancies in the fiscal information covering the period from 2019 to 2023.
According to the IMF, the audit revised Senegal’s average fiscal deficit upward by approximately 5.6 percentage points of gross domestic product during the period reviewed.
More significantly, central-government debt at the end of 2023 was revised from the previously reported figure of 74.4 per cent of GDP to approximately 99.7 per cent of GDP. (IMF)
This was not a minor accounting adjustment. It fundamentally changed the assessment of Senegal’s fiscal position and its capacity to repay existing and future obligations.
Subsequent efforts to identify additional liabilities, including the obligations of public entities and other government commitments, produced still higher estimates. The IMF and international financial analysts later placed Senegal’s broader public debt significantly above 100 per cent of GDP, with some estimates approaching 130 per cent once additional liabilities and arrears were considered. (Reuters)
Estimates of the previously unreported or misreported obligations have varied. The IMF’s calculations based on end-2023 figures reportedly identified more than US$11 billion, while some market and credit-rating analyses estimated the amount at approximately US$13 billion. (Reuters)
The variation does not necessarily mean that one figure is true and the other false. Different estimates may cover different dates, definitions of public debt, state-owned-enterprise obligations, domestic arrears, guarantees and other contingent liabilities.
The central fact remains undisputed: Senegal’s actual fiscal deficit and debt burden were materially higher than previously reported.
Was the debt literally hidden?
The expression “hidden debt” is politically powerful, but it should be used carefully.
Not all the debt was necessarily hidden in the sense of money being secretly deposited or stolen. Much of the controversy concerns obligations that were allegedly omitted, inaccurately classified, kept outside normal budget reporting channels or not consolidated into official public-debt statistics.
The problem may therefore include several categories:
* borrowing not properly captured in the official debt database;
* off-budget financing operations;
* liabilities incurred through public institutions;
* bank loans or treasury operations that were not fully consolidated;
* arrears and payment obligations;
* government guarantees and on-lending arrangements;
* inconsistencies between fiscal deficits, financing flows and reported debt.
These are technical accounting and public-finance issues, but their consequences are political and economic.
A government cannot ask citizens to accept taxes, subsidies reform or expenditure restraint while providing them with an incomplete picture of the nation’s finances.
Similarly, international lenders cannot responsibly assess a country’s creditworthiness when important liabilities are omitted from the information supplied to them.
Why did the IMF suspend its programme?
Before the discrepancies were revealed, Senegal had an IMF-supported financing arrangement worth approximately US$1.8 billion.
The programme was effectively frozen after the misreporting came to light. (Reuters)
This was not simply a punishment imposed by the IMF. The Fund’s lending decisions are based on official economic and financial information supplied by member governments.
When that information is materially inaccurate, the IMF must reassess several fundamental questions:
Can the country sustainably repay its debts?
How large is its actual fiscal deficit?
How much additional financing does it require?
Can the government implement the agreed economic programme?
Were earlier IMF disbursements approved on the basis of inaccurate information?
The IMF therefore initiated a formal misreporting process and required Senegal to adopt corrective measures before the matter could be resolved and a new programme considered.
By late 2025, the IMF acknowledged Senegal’s progress in identifying previously undisclosed liabilities, improving debt publications and cooperating with Fund staff. However, it also stated that further reforms were required, including stronger debt-management capacity and the centralisation of debt functions within a single ministry. (IMF)
The World Bank has similarly reported reforms intended to consolidate debt negotiation, disbursement and management functions and to improve the treatment of guarantees and lending to state-owned enterprises. (International Development Association)
Who bears responsibility?
This is where established facts must be separated from political allegations.
The present administration argues that the discrepancies originated under the former government and that it deserves credit for disclosing them.
Former President Macky Sall has denied misconduct, and questions of deliberate concealment, negligence, administrative failure or criminal responsibility must ultimately be determined through Senegal’s lawful investigative and judicial processes. (Reuters)
The IMF is not a criminal court. Its responsibility is to determine whether inaccurate information was supplied, assess the effect on previous programmes and ensure that corrective measures are implemented.
The Senegalese authorities must determine whether laws were broken, who authorised the transactions, which institutions failed in their oversight duties and whether any individual should face administrative, civil or criminal sanctions.
There must therefore be no rush to substitute political accusation for due process.
At the same time, the scale of the discrepancies makes it insufficient to dismiss the matter as an innocent bookkeeping error.
Senegal requires a transparent account of:
* how the additional borrowing was contracted;
* which institutions and officials authorised it;
* which banks, financial intermediaries and public entities were involved;
* how the borrowed resources were used;
* why the obligations were not properly reported;
* whether Parliament received complete information;
* whether the funds financed legitimate public investments;
* whether any part of the proceeds was misappropriated;
* and why domestic and international oversight mechanisms failed to detect the problem earlier.
Public debt does not belong to a government or a political party. It is a legal obligation imposed on the state and ultimately paid by citizens.
The IMF must also answer difficult questions
Although the primary responsibility for accurate reporting rests with the borrowing government, the IMF cannot entirely escape scrutiny.
The Fund maintained programmes with Senegal during much of the period in which the discrepancies accumulated. It conducted missions, reviewed fiscal performance and assessed debt sustainability.
It is therefore reasonable to ask why inconsistencies of this magnitude were not detected earlier.
Did IMF surveillance rely excessively on information supplied by a narrow group of government officials?
Were discrepancies visible between budget deficits, bank financing, treasury operations and the recorded debt stock?
Were the accounts of state-owned enterprises adequately examined?
Did the Fund have sufficient access to information from the regional central bank, commercial banks and other creditors?
Were political or institutional assumptions allowed to override financial warning signs?
These questions should not be used to shift responsibility away from Senegalese institutions. However, credible international oversight also requires institutional self-examination.
The lesson for the IMF is that programme monitoring cannot depend exclusively on headline figures furnished by finance ministries. It must include stronger reconciliation of fiscal accounts, monetary data, creditor records and public-enterprise obligations.
The economic consequences are already serious
A country’s public debt is not judged only by its nominal amount. Markets also assess whether the country’s institutions are trustworthy and whether official information can be relied upon.
Once confidence is damaged, the cost of borrowing rises.
Senegal has faced rating downgrades, higher yields on its international bonds, constrained access to global capital markets and increasing concern over the possibility of debt restructuring or reprofiling.
As of mid-2026, the government continued seeking a new IMF-supported programme while insisting that it did not wish to undertake a sovereign-debt restructuring. Nevertheless, investors and analysts increasingly questioned whether Senegal could restore debt sustainability without some form of creditor negotiation. (Reuters)
The authorities have also moved to engage international financial advisers as financing pressures intensify. (Reuters)
These developments carry direct consequences for ordinary Senegalese citizens.
Higher debt-service costs mean fewer resources for education, healthcare, agriculture, housing, water, electricity and employment creation.
Fiscal consolidation may require difficult decisions on subsidies, taxation and public expenditure.
Domestic borrowing can also absorb liquidity from the regional banking system, reducing the funds available to businesses and households throughout the West African Economic and Monetary Union.
Senegal’s problem can therefore create financial pressures beyond its borders.
Transparency by the new government deserves recognition—but it is not enough
The decision of the present administration to disclose the discrepancies was necessary and courageous.
Governments are often tempted to conceal inherited fiscal problems because disclosure can destabilise markets and create immediate political costs.
However, transparency must become a permanent system rather than a single political announcement.
The current government cannot build credibility merely by exposing the failures of its predecessor. It must ensure that similar practices do not occur under its own administration.
That requires publication of a complete and regularly updated debt register, including:
* central-government borrowing;
* loans contracted by public enterprises;
* guaranteed debt;
* public-private-partnership obligations;
* supplier arrears;
* commodity-backed or resource-backed financing;
* financial derivatives;
* letters of comfort;
* and other contingent liabilities.
All significant sovereign borrowing should be subjected to clear legal authorisation, parliamentary scrutiny, independent audit and timely public disclosure.
Lessons for The Gambia and West Africa
The Senegal crisis should be treated as a regional warning.
Many African countries face growing pressure to finance infrastructure, social programmes, energy projects and public-sector wages. Governments may increasingly use state-owned enterprises, special-purpose vehicles, public-private partnerships and domestic bank financing to raise resources outside the traditional budget.
These mechanisms are not inherently improper. However, when they are poorly recorded or deliberately excluded from public accounts, they create fiscal risks that eventually fall upon taxpayers.
For The Gambia and other neighbouring states, several reforms deserve urgent consideration.
First, every government should maintain a comprehensive public-debt database covering the entire public sector, rather than only the central government.
Second, no ministry, agency or state-owned enterprise should be permitted to contract debt or issue guarantees without prior approval under a clearly defined legal framework.
Third, Parliament should receive regular reports on debt, guarantees, arrears and public-private-partnership commitments.
Fourth, the Auditor General, central bank and parliamentary oversight committees must be adequately funded, technically competent and operationally independent.
Fifth, debt data should be reconciled periodically with information held by domestic banks, external creditors, development institutions and regional financial authorities.
Sixth, major borrowing agreements should be published, subject only to narrowly defined and legitimate commercial confidentiality provisions.
Seventh, public officials responsible for deliberate misreporting should face credible sanctions.
Finally, governments must distinguish between borrowing that creates productive national assets and borrowing that merely postpones difficult fiscal decisions.
Debt used for economically viable infrastructure, energy, agriculture and industrialisation can expand a country’s productive capacity.
Debt used inefficiently, concealed from oversight or contracted on unsustainable terms can become an intergenerational burden.
Senegal must choose reform over denial
Senegal still possesses important strengths.
It has a dynamic private sector, a strategic geographic position, significant human capital, established democratic institutions and emerging oil and gas production.
The country can overcome this crisis.
But natural resources and economic growth alone will not restore confidence. Trust must be rebuilt through verifiable reforms, disciplined fiscal management and credible institutional accountability.
The authorities should cooperate fully with the IMF while retaining national ownership of the reform process. An IMF programme should not become an end in itself. The objective must be to restore debt sustainability, protect vulnerable citizens, support economic growth and prevent a recurrence.
Any restructuring or reprofiling decision must be based on a transparent debt-sustainability analysis, not political slogans or market pressure alone.
Creditors must also share responsibility where lending occurred without adequate due diligence or outside proper disclosure channels.
Most importantly, the people of Senegal deserve to know the complete truth.
They deserve to know how much was borrowed, by whom, on what terms, for what purpose and with what results.
Conclusion
The greatest damage caused by hidden or misreported debt is not simply the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
It is the destruction of trust.
Trust between citizens and government.
Trust between Parliament and the executive.
Trust between the state and its development partners.
Trust between a sovereign borrower and the financial markets.
Senegal’s experience demonstrates that fiscal transparency is not an administrative luxury. It is a foundation of national sovereignty and economic security.
A country whose debts are unknown cannot plan its future honestly.
A government that does not disclose its obligations weakens the very sovereignty it claims to protect.
The way forward must therefore be built on transparency, accountability, institutional reform and responsible borrowing.
Senegal can turn this crisis into a historic opportunity to establish a new standard of fiscal governance for West Africa.
But that opportunity will be realised only when the full truth is established, responsibility is determined through due process and durable safeguards are created to ensure that no government can again borrow in the name of the people without giving a complete account to the people.
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