The prosecution, led by Police Commissioner A. Sanneh, alleged that on September 15, 2025, the accused participated in an unlawful protest at the National Audit Office over the removal of the Auditor General and attempted to hold a press conference without obtaining a permit from the Inspector General of Police.
During the trial, the prosecution called four police witnesses who testified that officers ordered the gathering to disperse because no permit had been obtained. However, under cross-examination, several officers conceded that the accused persons neither blocked access to the National Audit Office nor engaged in violence or destruction of property.
One prosecution witness admitted that the arrests were made because the accused insisted on holding a press conference without a permit, while another acknowledged that police maintained unrestricted access to the premises throughout the incident.
In her ruling, Magistrate Mbai held that the prosecution failed to produce evidence showing that the gathering created a reasonable fear of a breach of the peace, an essential element required to prove unlawful assembly under the Criminal Offense Act.
"The prosecution has failed to meet the legal threshold of unlawful assembly," the court ruled, finding no evidence of violence, threats, intimidation or conduct likely to provoke a breach of the peace.
On the charge of common nuisance, the court found that the prosecution also failed to establish that the gathering endangered the public or obstructed members of the public from exercising their rights.
The magistrate noted that no independent witnesses were called to testify that roads were blocked, public access was denied, or members of the public suffered inconvenience as a result of the gathering.
The court also rejected the prosecution’s attempt to rely on the Public Order Act.
Magistrate Mbai ruled that because the accused persons were not charged under that Act, the prosecution could not rely on its permit requirements to prove offences under the Criminal Offense Act.
"It is a fundamental principle of criminal justice that an accused person must answer only the offense charged," she stated, adding that statutory requirements from another law could not be imported to fill evidential gaps.
The court further held that one investigating officer's testimony was based entirely on information obtained from others and therefore amounted to hearsay, carrying no probative value in establishing a prima facie case.
Relying on the principles established in the landmark case R v Galbraith and Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the magistrate concluded that the prosecution had failed to present evidence on essential ingredients of both offense.
Subsequently she accordingly upheld the defense's no-case submission and acquitted and discharged all three accused persons on both counts.
