Issued Thursday 09 February 2017
The
beginning of the construction of the TransGambia Bridge heralded one of the
major infrastructural developments in The Gambia as it marks the first time
that a bridge would span the whole length of River Gambia. Despite this
important milestone, there have been some isolated questions raised about its implications
for The Gambia. For instance, fears have been expressed as to whether the
bridge would obstruct future river transportation. Or whether the economic
benefits of the bridge are worth the cost in terms of jobs lost in ferry
operations.
The
first reason why this bridge is an unambiguous benefit to the country is that
it essentially provided free. When completed, the TransGambia Bridge will be
942 meters long, costing about EUR 75 million. The funding for the bridge was
provided by the AfDB, along with other bilateral and multilateral donors.
Senegal and The Gambia incur only a small fraction of the cost, their combined
share of the cost being less than 1%. In addition, the funding comes mainly
(94%) through grants, which means virtually no fiscal burden on the two
countries.
The
fear that the bridge would obstruct future river transportation is overblown.
The bridge would be a cantilever design allowing for enough vertical clearance,
as well as between its main supports. Specifically, the two main supports of
the bridge would be 70 meters wide and the bridge will have a minimum clearance
of about 16.5 meters high. The resulting dimension would be sufficiently large
for any vessel capable of cruising up river. In other words, any boat large
enough to be obstructed by the bridge would be too big to sail upriver anyway
even in the absence of the bridge. Hence, there is no danger that the bridge
would obstruct future river transportation.
Another
concern that is frequently expressed is that the bridge may displace some
economic activity such as ferry operations and associated employment. This is
not an insignificant concern as the Gambia Ports Authority (GPA) has about 60
employees in the Yellitendan-Bambatenda crossing, where the bridge would be
located. Fortunately, the cost of redeploying these workers to other ferry
crossing points has already been included in the cost of the bridge, as well as
the cost of compensating those whose employment will be terminated. The
compensation to the owners of the few rice fields that would be affected by the
road leading to the bridge have also been accounted for. In other words, the
relatively minor physical and economic displacements caused by the construction
of the bridge are adequately compensated. It should be noted that consultations
with all affected individuals and communities have taken place well before
construction commenced.
The
fact of the matter is that even if the bridge project had not included the
above compensations, its construction would still have been justified. The
scale of the time savings from having a bridge across River Gambia is hard to
appreciate but nonetheless highly significant. A simple 1km stretch frequently
requires hours of waiting before one crosses, leading to countless lost opportunities.
For businesses, this means tremendous amount of inefficiencies in terms of
delays and high transaction cost. These costs are ultimately passed on to
Gambian consumers in terms of higher prices and low quality goods and services.
For instance, some trucks (both Gambian and Senegalese) spends up to two weeks
waiting to cross, leading to loss of perishable goods, with untold impact on
businesses, their employees and consumers. A lot of the economic costs are
invisible. For example, the high cost of crossing the ferry suppresses numerous
business opportunities. These economic costs are largely invisible to us since
the inefficient ferry crossing makes their existence impossible in the first
place. Other social costs are equally lamentable. It is a frequent occurrence
to see ambulances waiting to cross, delays which undoubtedly contributed to
avoidable mortality. Furthermore, since the ferries do not operate at night,
all transportation services between the north and south sides of the country
effectively shuts down for almost 12 hours every day. One way of appreciating
this is to imagine the economic impact of the existence of a ferry-based river
crossing between Brikama and Serrekunda. That simple exercise is enough to
understand the scale of lost opportunities resulting from the lack of bridge on
River Gambia. This barrier prevents economic integration within the country,
resulting in market fragmentation and significant price differentials that are
costly.
With
the construction of the bridge, a significant boost in economic activity can be
expected. Bridges on the scale of TransGambia can be expected to see a traffic
boost of up to 50%. This would mean a high boon to the corridor along the
TransGambia highway, particularly to the towns of Farafenni and Soma. This
would include the elimination of price differences in locations across the
north bank that are mainly attributable to transportation costs. The resulting
economic activity and employment generation would be more than enough to
compensate for any possible loss of employment from Ferry operations. In fact,
tax revenue generation from greater economic activities would more than offset
any lost ferry fees. By the way, ferry operations are a money-losing service
for the GPA (hence a net fiscal burden) since the ferries are quite old and
consume excessive amounts of fuel and break down with high frequencies.
Patients on the south bank needing to reach the Farafenni hospital at night can
do so without wasting precious hours waiting for the ferry the following
morning.
A
frequent red-herring that frequently gets mentioned is that the benefit of the
bridge may be greater for Senegal than The Gambia. Even if that were true
(which is far from obvious), this point is irrelevant. The economic and social
benefits of the bridge to The Gambia alone are sufficient to justify its
construction, irrespective of the degree of its benefits to Senegal. Moreover,
the benefits to Senegal are an added bonus to The Gambia. This is because the
reality of Gambia’s geography (being in the middle of Senegal) ensures that
benefits to Senegal cannot bypass us. Furthermore, as a small country, the
advantages of greater economic integration with the Senegalese economy far
outweigh any drawbacks. Therefore, to the extent that the TransGambia Bridge
will promote greater economic integration both within and between the two
countries, this is an additional reason to justify its construction.
Dr
Ousman Gajigo is an economist who works for the UN-FAO in Rome, Italy. He
previously worked at the World Bank and the African Development Bank.
