What
does 2017 have in store for African politics? This is not an easy question to
answer. For one thing, Africa has a habit of surprising us, making fools out of
many a political forecaster. For another, the distinctive histories and
political contexts of the different countries on the continent defy easy
generalisation.
Over
the last twelve months, for example, Africa witnessed two very different
trajectories at the same time. In one, presidents in countries such as Burundi
and Rwanda entrenched their hold on power, overturning presidential term limits
and repressing opposition parties. In another, presidents in Gambia and Ghana
lost elections, which gave African democracy a much-needed shot in the arm - at
least until the outgoing Gambian leader, Yahya Jammeh, changed his mind.
The
next year is likely to witness similar diversity, serving as an important
reminder - if it were needed - that Africa is not a country. However, if a
theme does emerge from these different pathways, like the thread that holds
together a complex necklace, it is likely to be one of intense political
contestation.
In
other words, 2017 is set to be a year in which ruling and opposition parties
face off in “too close to call” elections and struggle over the rules of the
political game. While some of these processes will be carried over from 2016,
important new arenas of contention will also emerge that will shape the development
of African politics for years to come.
The
rules of the game: from term limits to electoral commissions
As
opposition parties gain ground, contestation over the rules of the political
game is only likely to increase. Recently, one of the main focal points of this
struggle has been presidential term limits. In the last two years alone,
presidents in Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
Rwanda, have sought to extend their stay in power, leading to conflict with
opposition parties and civil society groups. However, in 2017 the focus of
government/opposition tensions is likely to shift away from term limits towards
the independence and competence of electoral commissions.
Although
the fate of President Joseph Kabila in the DRC - who has served two terms and
would like a third - is yet to be settled, there are few other term limit
crises on the horizon. The reason for this is that presidential elections are
only scheduled to take place in Angola, Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and
Somalia this year.
Term
limits will not be an issue in Kenya because President Uhuru Kenyatta is in his
first term, or in Rwanda where President Paul Kagame has already secured the
right to stay in power. In Angola, the term limits introduced in the new constitution
were not applied retrospectively, while in Liberia the ruling party has already
announced that it will be running a new candidate, defusing any controversy.
This
leaves Sierra Leone. In early 2016, supporters of President Ernest Bai Koroma
started to test the waters for a third term bid, claiming that he needed “more
time” in office to complete projects that were interrupted by the Ebola crisis.
However, since then, this ploy appears to have been effectively rebuffed by a
strong coalition of opposition parties and international donors whose grants
and loans make up around 40% of government expenditure.
In
the absence of term limit crises, attention will turn to the competence of
Africa’s electoral commissions. General elections in Kenya, Liberia and Sierra
Leone are expected to be hotly contested, and in all three countries a close
race is likely to test the independence and capacity of electoral management
bodies.
This
is a cause for concern because the credibility of the electoral process remains
in doubt in much of Africa, especially in Kenya where opposition legislators
recently called its supporters to the streets to oppose changes to the
electoral laws. A similar situation may well transpire in the DRC should
elections be held later this year as envisaged in a recent deal between the
government and opposition parties. Unless leaders in states like these are
willing to embark on a genuine programme of building trust in key institutions,
2017 is likely to be to witness disputed elections and further allegations of
democratic backsliding.
Social
media, new technologies and government control
The
growing use of social media in Africa represents a boon for civil society
groups and opposition parties. Last year, the continent saw the rise of political
and social movements such as #thisflag in Zimbabwe and #feesmustfall in South
Africa, which were driven in part by the ability to use new technologies to
quickly communicate ideas and information in the absence of formal political
structures.
In
2017, an increasing number of civil society groups and political parties will
integrate social media into the heart of their campaigns. However, while the
potential for Twitter, Snapchat and Facebook to substitute for traditional
methods of political mobilisation is an exciting prospect, it is important not
to exaggerate the significance of this trend or the vulnerability of ruling
parties to new technologies in 2017.
To
start with, the penetration of the Internet is limited in many countries and
this is unlikely to change much over the next twelve months. For example, while
more than 25% of Kenyans and Nigerians own smartphones, this figure drops to 4%
in Ethiopia and Uganda, and 11% in Tanzania. Given this, the prospects for such
technologies to strengthen the position of opposition parties, or to act as a
check on corruption, is limited.
A
second problem is that in 2017 governments will start to respond to the
challenge of social media more effectively. This process has already begun in
many countries, where political parties sponsor supporters to tweet and call in
to radio shows as if they are ordinary citizens, shaping what are supposed to
be organic debates. This year, these strategies will gather pace as governments
in more authoritarian states learn from one another about how best to regulate
and manipulate new forms of communication.
For
example, following an example set by Gabon, Zimbabwe is set to introduce
Cybersecurity legislation that the government claims is simply designed to
protect national security but which critics have alleged represents an attempt
to control the media and flow of information. A similar debate is currently
underway in South Africa, where the ruling ANC’s attempt to introduce a deeply
problematic Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill has triggered vociferous
opposition from a range of civil society groups.
Over
the year, this kind of contestation is likely to spread to an increasing number
of countries as government efforts to gain greater control over new
technologies of communication are opposed by activists determined to resist
censorship and to maintain the transformative potential of social media.
The
international community
To
some extent, the way in which this contestation will play out will be shaped by
the response of the international community. The influence of foreign
governments should not be overstated - democracy cannot be built from the
outside in - but in countries where the there is a delicate balance of power
between the government and opposition, international pressure can sway an
outcome one way or another.
While
US President Barack Obama’s engagement with African issues during his time in
office has been limited, under his leadership the US hardened its support for
key democratic institutions such as term limits. By using America’s financial
muscle and ability to directly target the financial assets of leaders inclined
to disobey the rule of law, his administration generated new incentives for
African governments to respect their constitutions. This was not always successful,
as the number of presidents now serving a third term demonstrates, but it did
strengthen the hand of opposition parties and civil society groups in some
countries.
It
seems unlikely that the US will remain as committed to these goals under Donald
Trump. Although the new administration will probably appoint a number of old
hands to manage the day-to-day business of engaging with foreign partners,
there is no evidence that the president-elect is concerned about good
governance beyond America’s borders, or indeed within them. Those who bemoan
Western interference in African affairs will welcome this development, but it
is important to keep in mind that it is likely to come at a cost.
Although
European states are broadly supportive of good governance in Africa, they have
neither the funding nor the sense of purpose to replace the role played by the
US. Moreover, following the coordinated African attack on the International
Criminal Court (ICC), many wish to avoid taking a leading role for fear of
being accused of neo-colonialism. In the absence of international engagement,
an increasing number of episodes of contestation are likely to be won by the
government unless opposition parties and civil society groups can find new ways
to outwit those in power and hold them to account.
This,
then, may well turn out to be the real story of 2017: the struggle of
grassroots activists and parties operating in authoritarian and
semi-authoritarian contexts to prevent a further decline in the quality of
political rights and civil liberties in their countries. How this story plays
out is of the utmost importance for the future of democracy in Africa, because
if these battles are lost it will undermine the ability of ordinary citizens to
have a say on the issues that affect their own lives for years to come.
Nic
Cheeseman is Professor of Democracy at Birmingham University. Follow him on
twitter at @fromagehomme.
