Sixteen days after the outbreak of war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the combined military power of the United States and Israel, the world is indeed witnessing the troubling confirmation of many warnings that were voiced before the first missiles were fired on 28 February 2026.
Like most observers, my central concern was the impracticality of confining a war of such magnitude and tactics to the battlefield. That it would definitively, among other unintended consequences, ripple outward across borders, destabilize markets, disrupt travel and commerce, and deepen the fractures of an already fragile international order.
Across the Middle East and alongside the mounting death toll, countless wounded, and growing waves of displacement, relentless bombardment has inflicted widespread destruction on equipment and critical infrastructure. Under the pressure of intensifying military operations, regional airspace has also become increasingly restricted. Commercial aviation, normally the backbone of modern mobility, has been forced into costly and complex rerouting. Hundreds of flights have been cancelled or diverted across Israel, Iraq, Jordan, and the Gulf states.
Countries that rely heavily on tourism are already witnessing declining visitor numbers as insurance premiums surge and travelers grow increasingly reluctant to approach the region overshadowed by missile exchanges and military alerts.
Yet, the most consequential economic tremor lies not in the skies but in the narrow maritime passage known as the Strait of Hormuz.
This narrow maritime corridor between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula carries nearly one-fifth of global oil shipments each day. Iran has formally declared the it closed, creating an environment of extreme insecurity. Tanker traffic has come under attack, prompting insurers to cancel coverage or hike premiums, while several vessels attempting to navigate the passage have sustained serious damage.
Consequently oil prices, which hovered around $80 per barrel before the conflict, have surged past $100 amid jittery markets, with some analysts forecasting it to climb to $200 or more within weeks. Liquefied natural gas shipments from Qatar, one of the world’s largest exporters, are experiencing delays and sharply higher insurance costs. Countries heavily reliant on imported energy, particularly in Europe, Asia, and Africa, now face the prospect of rising fuel prices, higher electricity bills, and renewed inflationary pressures.
For economically vulnerable regions, including large parts of Africa, the implications could prove particularly severe. Rising fuel prices will inevitably ripple through transportation networks and food supply chains, further straining the already fragile balance between economic survival and national stability.
Yet beyond these economic tremors lies a deeper strategic question that remains curiously unanswered. What precisely is the endgame of this war?
When the United States and Israel launched what they described as “Operation Epic Fury,” the publicly stated objectives appeared relatively clear. The mission, it was said, sought to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, degrade its long- and short-range ballistic missile capabilities, and compel Tehran to abandon support for regional allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi movement in Yemen.
However, as the conflict has unfolded, the narrative surrounding these objectives appears to have shifted. What began as an operation framed in terms of deterrence and containment has also been declared as an attempt to change the regime.
This development raises a serious strategic puzzle. Excepts when United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Japan on August 6, 1945, history offers no convincing examples of a government being overthrown solely through aerial bombardment without the decisive presence of ground forces. May God forbid but would that devastating incident be repeated again in this conflict?
The belief that a political system can collapse under air campaigns alone runs counter to the hard lessons of modern warfare. Yet, curiously, President Donald Trump and the U.S. Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, are no longer ruling out the possibility of deploying American combat troops to Iran with over 2000 marines heading to the region.
Equally questionable was the assumption that the elimination of key Iranian leadership figures would trigger a spontaneous uprising capable of dismantling the Iranian state from within. In practice, the opposite has occurred.
Following the assassination ofAli Khamenei, the long-serving supreme leader of Iran, together with members of his family in the opening phase of the conflict, the Iranian political system did not collapse but adapted rapidly. His son, Mojtaba (Mustaba) Khamenei, was elevated to the position of Supreme Leader, and the country’s governing institutions, along with large segments of the Iranian population, have since rallied around him and his call for continued national resistance.
Instead of fragmenting under external pressure, the Iranian state appears to have consolidated its internal cohesion, defying expectations that it would quickly capitulate, based on precedents such as Venezuela.
Moreover, despite claims that its missile stockpiles were nearly depleted a week ago, Iran continues to strike targets across the region, including Israel, U.S.-linked sites in Gulf states and Jordan. Its use of advanced ballistic missiles with cluster warheads against Israel is testing the limits of the “Iron Dome,” signaling a shift from a brief conflict to a prolonged strategic struggle.
These developments prompted the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2817 on 11 March 2026, condemning Iran’s attacks on Gulf states and Jordan. The resolution passed with thirteen votes in favor, while Russia and China abstained. Among them were roughly thirty African countries, including Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Seychelles.
Nevertheless, the vote once again revealed Africa’s persistent diplomatic fragmentation. Countries such as Algeria, South Africa, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Eritrea and the Central African Republic distanced themselves from the motion.
Meanwhile The Gambia has aligned with the pro-resolution camp. President Adama Barrow, the current OIC Chairman, on Wednesday, 11 March consulted with leaders of UAE, Kuwait and Jordan, reflecting the country’s traditional diplomatic posture on the Middle East crisis.
Conversely, Senegal was among the 30 African co-sponsoring states of the verdict, despite President Diomaye Faye’s earlier condemnation of Iran’s attack and Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko’s more cautiously neutral statement
Iran rejected the resolution outright. Its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Amir-Saeid Iravani, sharply criticized the measure for condemning Iran’s retaliation while remaining silent on what Tehran describes as the initial attacks by the United States and Israel on 28 February.
On 12 March, defiant Mojtaba (Mustaba) Khamenei declared that the war was imposed on Iran and therefore cannot end except on terms acceptable to Tehran. Those terms reportedly include recognition of Iran’s sovereignty, compensation for damage caused by the initial attacks, guarantees against future aggression and the withdrawal of American forces from several Gulf bases.
Indeed, sixteen days into the conflict, the most unsettling reality is that the world still does not know how this war is going to end.
