I was going to remain quiet about the December 20, 2022, foiled-coup plot, as reported because of the initial contradictory impression I had had from reading the government spokesman’s press release and listening to the GAF-PRO clarifications. Whereas the government press release definitively described the incident as a foiled coup plot with six soldier together with their ringleader identified and apprehended, the GAF PRO in a separate interview narrated a different incident of a normal inter-unit-drill competition at Fajara Barracks that was wrongly portrayed as a coup d’tat in progress.
Thankfully, I was able to verify and confirm behind the scenes with both parties-the government and the GAF-that the press release by Mr Ebrima Sankareh on the 21st of December 2022 was right on the money, despite the cynics casting doubts over the credibility of his message.
Critics are entitled to their pessimistic opinions but to trivialize or downplay the importance of who is good or not good enough to successfully carry out a coup d’tat is total absurdity. Absurd because only inexperienced critics will promulgate the notion that Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) lack the competence to successfully organize coups. A coup according to military denotation is nothing but a mutiny aimed at undermining the legality and order in which the security establishment of a state is anchored. It is absolutely illegal and punishable by death to all guilty perpetrators.
Nonetheless, during the TRRC hearings our low IQ lawyers tried to peddle the bovine idea that coups are illegal but not after they are successfully carried out which, after all, was an outrageous encouragement of adventurous soldiers with the audacity and psychological deficiency to give it a shot when they can. Besides, Sanna Biro Sabally, a criminal in uniform, by every definition of the word, was publicly celebrated and left to go free after admitting his role in the summarily execution of captured mutineers in 1994, and after dogmatically arguing that soldiers are constitutionally obligated to seize power from “corrupt governments”, whether democratically elected or not. Are Gambians therefore surprised that the suspected ringleader in this week’s mutiny is called Sanna with previous attributes very similar to that of his namesake Sanna Sabally? In the 80s, Sanna Sabally, while attending Armitage High School was among the ringleaders of students who organised one of the worst high school riots ever in the country while Sanna Fadera is equally notorious for his pivotal role in leading a students’ protest at the University of The Gambia that ultimately resulted in the removal of the vice chancellor. How both men beat the vetting system of the armed forces is a story for another day.
However, the lesson learnt is that the vetting system to enlist and promote soldiers is still not thorough enough to prevent rebellious elements from slipping into the armed forces through the permeable cracks.
Anyway, the question of whether NCOs have the command and control capability to organize coups or not, is analogous to interrogating who carries the ideal rank or position to orchestrate a mutiny in security establishments. What we know about the history of those who champion mutiny in security forces indicates that any one in active duty, officers and other ranks alike, could lead it up to its success or failure. As a matter of fact, based on my personal experience, the most effective participants in the 1994 coup were the NCOs from Yundum Barracks who later felt betrayed by the young officers and thought they could once again repeat the same rebellion four months after in November when all of them were literally wiped out. Apparently if 3 second lieutenants and 1 lieutenant under the command of Nigerian generals, colonels, majors and captains could pull off a coup as the indicators were in 1994, questioning the proficiency of NCOs to repeat the same thing now would indeed sound parochial.
Also worth considering is the fluidity in coups, that make them prone to failure in equal proportion to their success and have, in their failed states, degenerated into protracted national instabilities or civil wars where even newly recruited soldiers, although more often than not, street criminals and vagabonds metamorphose into unappeasable warlords. Corporal Foday Sanko of Sierra Leone and Master Sergeant Samual Doe of Liberia were typical examples of mutinous NCOs who failed or succeeded in their leap of faith to seize power respectively.
It will be sheer recklessness when the authorities waste time to apprehend suspected coup plotters whose seditiousness are proven beyond doubt. The plot to overthrow the PPP government in 1994, highlighted in my book, was hatched in May 1994 during a military exercise organized by our “superior” Nigerian commanders at Kudang Village. Incidentally, well before D-Day the authorities in Banjul were forewarned about the soldiers holding secret meetings at Yundum Barracks to overthrow the PPP government. A courageous and concerned soldier at the camp whose mother was a PPP “Yayie Compin” alerted her mother about the conspiracy who in turn reported the matter to the office of the vice president. But instead of taking the timely and necessary action to neutralize the ringleaders like what happened this week, the soldier who snitched on his colleagues was detained at the NIA and interrogated for days up to the day of the mutiny on the 22nd of July 1994.
Hence, I must say that the security forces today deserve special commendation for doing the right thing at the right time.
Let no one fool you buddy; if we are to go by the flawed hypothesis that the inferiority or superiority of soldiers on active duty in the hierarchy of the armed forces matters in determining the organizers of a successful or failed coup then the second lieutenants carrying the lowest ranks, way below that of the superior Nigerian generals, colonels and majors in 1994 wouldn’t have succeeded.
But trust me folks, coup d’tat, mutiny, armed insurrection, name it, are the worst solutions to our political problems. You need to read my book to understand the treachery and brutality associated with the 1994 coup d’tat and to further understand where I am coming from.
The rest is how to prevent the contagious adventurism from affecting others in the absence of a rigorous vetting system in the armed forces. The Security-Sector Reform initiative in 2017 should have included such a vetting system for both promotions and appointments of officers and other ranks.