Twenty-one years after its founding in 2004 and eleven years since declaring a caliphate in 2014, the Islamic State’s territorial presence in Iraq and Syria has diminished significantly. At its height, the organisation fielded up to 80,000 militants, including more than 42,000 foreign terrorist fighters from over 120 countries. In contrast, by mid-2025, estimates suggest only 1,500 to 3,000 fighters remain active in Syria and Iraq.
Despite the Islamic State having shrunk in the Middle East, its global presence has expanded significantly, and by the end of 2024, the Islamic State remained the deadliest terrorist organisation in the world. Since the loss of its self-proclaimed Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in 2019, and some 60,000 combatants, the organisation has undergone radical structural and operational changes. In 2025, the Islamic State relies primarily on a dynamic network of regional affiliates who operate with a greater autonomy of action than ever before, with Afghanistan-based IS-Khorasan being the most prominent branch linked to numerous high-profile attacks in Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, Turkey, etc.
While there is an ongoing debate among experts who claim that the Islamic State has been degraded into a decentralised network of affiliated branches and others who claim that it has instead evolved into an even more cohesive globally integrated organisation, one could reasonably argue that the Islamic State has adopted a hybrid model that features elements of both.
Forced to abandon its ambitions of a territory-based caliphate, it gradually shifted to a less hierarchical structure and a more decentralised operational model with the intent of enhancing the chances of its survival and the resilience of its regional structures. Even the fact that as of mid-2025 there is no clear understanding of the real identity of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, the fifth and current caliph of the Islamic State, is likely a reflection of this shift toward a hybrid structure that prioritises flexibility and security over centralised control, given that a named leader is arguably less critical for operational continuity in a non-centralised structure.
At the same time, while adopting a regionalised model that fosters agility and flexibility through a less hierarchical structure, the Islamic State core retains connectivity and oversight over its network of global affiliates through its restructured General Directorate of Provinces, that acts as the central hub for provision of operational support, funding and ideological guidance. In sum, the current hybrid model balances regional autonomy with centralised oversight, allowing the Islamic State to remain adaptable while pursuing its global jihadist agenda.
Much like in the case of the current caliph, the identity of the overarching leader of the General Directorate of Provinces remains unknown. Nevertheless, as of the time of writing, UN sources have named Abdallah Makki Mosleh al-Rafi’i (alias Abu Khadija al-Iraqi), an Iraqi national born in 1991 and one of the main known leaders of the Islamic State, as the possible Head of the Directorate and the Delegated Committee. His listing as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist was announced by the US State Department on 8 June 2023.
Despite the uncertainties surrounding the current leadership and the debate on its organisational model, the Islamic State’s adaptability is evident in its sustained ability to radicalise and recruit new militants to its cause and to direct or inspire deadly attacks from Kerman, Iran, in January 2024 to Moscow, Russia, in March 2024 and from Solingen, Germany, in August 2024 to New Orleans, US, in January 2025. These incidents testify not only to the continued appeal of its brand of violent ideology but also to the organisation’s resilience and global reach.
Syria, together with the Democratic Republic of Congo, experienced the highest numbers of fatalities in 2024 resulting from Islamic State activities globally. The number of attacks in Syria in 2024 surged significantly to almost 700 compared to 2023, when the number was almost three times smaller. This resurgence was arguably as much due to the weakening control of the beleaguered central government in the fractured Arab state as it was the result of a push by the Islamic State to reconstitute its capabilities in Syria after a period of decreased activity.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, following the Syrian Army’s collapse, has fuelled sectarian violence in early 2025, raising fears that the resulting governance vacuum and worsening security situation could enable the Islamic State to regroup and expand in Syria. However, these concerns have not fully materialised in 2025, as attack numbers have in fact decreased compared to 2024, with most incidents occurring in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled areas in northeastern Syria. This indicates the Islamic State is adapting by targeting regions with weaker control while reorganising and rebuilding its networks. Notably, an increase in attacks was observed in April-May 2025, coinciding with the US military’s troop reduction from 2,000 to approximately 700.
Detention facilities and camps in northeastern Syria pose another persistent security challenge. Approximately 8,500 suspected Islamic State-affiliated militants are held in over twenty SDF-run facilities, with 64 percent Syrians, 19 percent Iraqis, and 17 percent foreign nationals from over 50 countries. Additionally, around 38,400 individuals – mostly wives, widows, children, or relatives of suspected militants – are detained in al-Hol and Roj camps. Of these, 42 percent are Syrians, 36 percent Iraqis, and 22 percent nationals of over 50 other countries. This contingent remains a key focus of Islamic State propaganda and operations, including repeated attacks on SDF-run prisons to free militants.
The 8,500 detained militants, many with combat experience, pose an immediate security threat due to their potential to regroup if liberated. The Islamic State has exploited regional instability to launch such attacks, notably the January 2022 assault on al-Sina’a Prison in Hasakah, which killed over 500 and freed scores of fighters. Ongoing attacks in SDF-controlled areas may be a strategic push to strain SDF resources and facilitate further breakouts. Meanwhile, the camps, where 60 percent of residents are children – many of them orphans or separated from families, living in fear amid violence and extremist influences – present a grave humanitarian and long-term security challenge. These children, raised in squalid conditions with limited access to water, food, healthcare, or education, are highly vulnerable to trauma and radicalisation, amplifying the risk of future extremism.
A Guest Editorial