The economic impact of migration, for both origin and destination countries, generally tends to be positive. However, as Europe struggles with aging populations and African countries face the challenges of demographic growth, irregular migration flows – and how a growing share of the electorate perceives them – have fueled political tensions across the EU.
A win-win outcome will be difficult to attain. In the short and medium term, the EU will likely address irregular migration by readjusting (and in some cases reducing) the “pull” factors that incentivize migration, increasing border protection measures and establishing partnerships with third countries. But Europe could also play an important role in supporting export-based growth across the African continent, thus reducing migration’s “push” factors in the long run.
Nevertheless, migration push factors in Africa will remain and likely intensify over the next decades. The main reason is simple: economic growth and opportunities are not keeping pace with population growth. The rapid expansion of the global working-age population is shifting from Asia to Africa, and by 2050, more than half of the latter’s population will be under 25 years old.
Income disparities between African and European countries will persist over the coming decades. Moreover, migration is costly and often not viable for the poorest. That means that under a scenario of economic growth across Africa, migration to Europe would increase during the initial stage due to enduring income disparities between the two regions.
There are many reasons for these disparities, and while Africa is a highly diverse continent, two factors stand out. First, late colonialism deeply affected African nation-building and state-formation processes and, consequently, governance patterns. In South Africa, for example, a national “state of disaster” was recently declared over persisting power shortages caused by poor governance and rampant corruption. In Sahelian countries, state fragility is one of the root causes of chronic violence.
The EU may be pressed to curb its protectionist instincts, reducing the regulatory hurdles that block African products from the European market.
A second factor is that African economies, unlike their Asian counterparts, could not benefit from the post-Cold War period of hyper-globalization that helped lift millions out of poverty. Without economic transformation – through industrial and agricultural revolutions, for example – the problems of low productivity and unemployment will likely remain. By 2047, according to the Institute for Security Studies, Africa is expected to account for a quarter of the world’s population – but less than 6 percent of the global economy.
The paths toward accelerated growth and development vary by country. In some cases, as in Rwanda, it was possible to move directly to a service- and knowledge-based economy. However, this kind of leapfrogging demands adequate digital infrastructure and technical innovation, while the services sector has less potential to increase productivity and create jobs. For countries with a vast territory and a large and growing workforce, like Nigeria, this may not be a solution.
At the same time, an increase in intra-regional and inter-regional trade has the potential to accelerate export-led growth and expand economic opportunities across Africa, especially after the enactment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). While many of the reasons behind Africa’s poor trade performance can only be addressed by African countries, Europe could play a prominent role as the largest market for African exports during a period characterized by regionalization rather than globalization.
For decades, the approach to Africa’s economic challenges from Europe – both that of the EU and that of individual member states – has focused more on aid than trade. Aid, however, does not itself deliver (and may hinder) economic transformation processes. A growing consensus, already expressed in the Africa-EU Strategy, is that trade may be a decisive factor.