Greg
Mills, Jeffrey Herbst, Olusegun Obasanjo and Dickie Davis (editors)
The
following fast facts have been revealed in this book: the population of Africa will
double to two billion in 2045; by then, more than half of Africans will be
living in cities; the young will primarily be connected through mobile devices;
more than 40 percent of Africans are still living under the absolute poverty
level of $1,90 per day; climate change is affecting food production;
manufacturing is suffering because of the export of raw materials rather than
beneficiating locally; mining is still big business; services and technology
are catching up in parts of Africa; the Chinese are vital to the provision of
infrastructure and project finance; and finally, the East Asian model of
development before democracy (Singapore, Vietnam and even Dubai) is more
suitable for Africa. The evidence? Rwanda, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria,
Côte d’Ivoire, Angola, Mozambique, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Namibia and Malawi are often referred to.
This
book of 317 pages is structured into three parts. Part 1 deals with the state
of Africa’s people, institutions and structures, with special reference to
cities, democracy and development, and infrastructure. Although Africa is poor,
the authors say cities are the best path out of poverty, but warn against “the
demons of density”.
Unfortunately,
no attention is paid to Africa’s specially designed cities of Dodoma
(Tanzania), Abuja (Nigeria), Gaborone (Botswana) and Lilongwe (Malawi). Do they
have demons of a better kind?
On
democracy and development, the authors prefer the non-African model of East
Asia, that is, of development before democracy, as in Singapore. Their nearest
African case study to this model is Rwanda. It is a pity, however, that there
is no theoretical input here, exactly as writers such as SM Lipset, SP
Huntington, Adam Przeworski, Barrington Moore and Nicolas van de Walle have
written about.
On
Rwanda, parallels are drawn with Singapore’s strong leadership, the pivotal
role of parastatals and the ease of doing business. However, two longer-term
weaknesses that deserved attention are not discussed: one, Rwanda’s population
density of 420 persons per square kilometre is the highest in Africa and makes
for demographic pressures, which, in Africa, have almost always threatened
stability whenever land scarcities arise – the demons of density are therefore also
rural; and two, Paul Kagame’s government in Rwanda is a clear case of Tutsi
minority rule, and, as we know, any minority rule – whether in [white]
Rhodesia, or [apartheid] South Africa, or centuries of [minority] Amharic rule
in imperial Abyssinia/Ethiopia – is democratically unsustainable, and will
inevitably make way for majority rule (in Rwanda’s case, Hutu rule, as in
neighbouring Burundi).
The
chapter on infrastructure spells out how poor the conditions in Africa still
are, especially those of transportation and access to electricity. Then the
authors ask the question of where infrastructural funding comes from. The
surprise answers are internal development institutions, then Asian sources
(especially Chinese), African development banks, multilateral banks such as the
World Bank or IMF, then European, Arabian and American donors, and, lastly,
commercial lending from local banks. However, in Part 3, they opt for China’s
model of swapping African resources for Chinese infrastructural investments in
Africa.
Part
2 deals with economic sectors, where agriculture and manufacturing are arguably
the weakest.
For
example, 40 of the 55 African states are food importers, the most expensive
food for urban consumers is in Nigeria and Kenya, and all leading agricultural
exports in Africa today are genetically modified organisms (GMO). The authors
should tell us whether this is safe or not. Interestingly, 15 African states
are cited as net agricultural exporters. Closer scrutiny reveals that, of the
top six, only one – South Africa – exports food. The others are exporters of
cash crops, such as cocoa, coffee and tobacco (and vulnerable to commodity
cycles).
Manufacturing
in Africa has suffered: firstly, during colonial times, when raw materials were
exported, as beneficiation took place abroad; and secondly, today, as China
does the same. No wonder manufacturing represents only 14 percent of the
sub-Saharan African GDP.
The
book makes a case for services which are about tourism, banking and insurance.
Yet, only two countries in Africa receive 40 percent of all tourists today:
Morocco and South Africa. South African banking is also by far stronger than
the rest of Africa combined, with Kenya top in mobile banking (“M-Pesa”). And,
interestingly, the most profitable part of insurance in Africa is revealed as
funeral business.
Mining
is big business in Africa. This continent is well-endowed with gold, titanium,
manganese, cobalt, diamonds, phosphates, coal, chromite and platinum. At the
height of the recent commodity boom (in 2012), mining represented 28 percent of
the continent’s GDP, but has dropped sharply since, with Botswana (diamonds),
Zambia (copper) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (copper, cobalt, diamonds,
coltan and gold) suffering most.
However,
the thrust of this book is Part 3 (“Making Africa Work”). Five principles are
identified: business-friendly mindsets, policy certainty, reducing the cost of
doing business, limitations on foreign aid and, finally, embracing Chinese
engagement.
Part
3 begins with Chapter 9, which could have been an extension of the chapter on
democracy and development. It deals with the “how” of development, listed here
as the better mobilisation of resources and the de-risking of investments. For
the authors, the mobilisation of resources is mainly about the financing of
projects, which features the Chinese model of swapping African resources for
Chinese investments in infrastructure. But what about beneficiation and
taxation policies? The only case study discussed is China and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. (What about Angola and Zimbabwe, where this model also
applies?)
Other
sources of funding in Africa are listed as bond (or debt) markets; official
development assistance (ODA), usually from the “North” (say, the European Union
or the USA) to the “South” (say, Africa or Latin America); private equity; and
remittance from members of the diaspora to relatives in home countries
(examples that come to mind are Eritrea, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe).
Mozambique
is scrutinised. By about 2010–2012, donors viewed this country as a “success
story”, with growth rates averaging nine percent, vast coal deposits at Tete,
and offshore gas. But when the government failed to declare debts in 2015, the
IMF pulled the plug with “things going bad again”, and the metical plunged by
40 percent. For the authors, the lesson here is that resources and economic
potential are not enough, and that good governance matters, which, in this
case, is all about transparency.
The
penultimate chapter in this book deals with the “planning for success”. Five
points are made: plan for growth that reduces unemployment; involve the
business sector; prioritise; recruit the “best available”; and circumscribe
foreign roles. This is a let-down, as readers would certainly want to know more,
as Africa’s 55 states are not the same. Certainly, one-size-fits-all cannot
work.
The
authors critique “National Plans”, where, in Malawi’s case, there was “too much
goal setting”; in Zambia’s case, there were “no less than six National
Development Plans”, but “no delivery”; and on Zambian agriculture, there was
“this huge pile of paper … [but] very little actually happened”. All this may
be true. But what is the evidence?
Any
success stories? The authors cite Singapore for meritocracy, pragmatism and honesty.
The best success records in Africa are given as Mauritius and Rwanda.
The
final chapter in this book deals with “leadership and delivery”. The listed
principles are democracy, execution, personal skills and “accountability
through transparency”. It deals with Nigeria, Ethiopia, Botswana and Côte
d’Ivoire, but the comparisons are not consistent.
For
example, Nigeria’s challenges are given as high debt and sharia law. (What
about petrodollar corruption, lack of diversification, high dependence on oil
and the bad governance of mega cities?) Then Ethiopia’s case successes are
listed: fast GDP growth, Ethiopian Airlines, the flower export industry and
[Chinese] shoe factories. But what about the challenges such as land scarcity
for the 80 percent ruralised population, various civil and international wars
in the Horn of Africa in which the Ethiopian military participated, the recent
police crackdowns on the people of the Oromo and Amhara regions, and the
absence of private banks and/or any property rights in Ethiopia?
One
more point on Ethiopia: why does the partially Chinese-funded Grand Renaissance
Dam in the Blue Nile provide for only hydroelectricity, and not also for
irrigation for food production, in a country where droughts and famines are
legendary?
In
Botswana’s case, Gaborone is lauded for “cranes, traffic jams and hotels”. What
about having the second highest HIV infection percentages in Africa; the lack
of diversification for the days when Botswana runs out of diamonds; and
President Ian Khama praising his own military background as explanation for his
strong leadership (without any reference to his autocratic style of governance,
violation of press freedom and intolerance of opposition)?
And,
finally, why include Côte d’Ivoire in this list? Under Felix Houphouet-Boigny,
the country enjoyed high growth, thanks to high coffee and cocoa prices – also
during the recent boom period. Since then, it has been struggling to deal with
both democracy and development.
The
three chapters of Part 3 are the crux of this book, the “handbook for economic
success”. As implied above, this part was not nearly as well researched and
conceptualised as Parts 1 and 2. Still, Tafelberg/NB Publishers must be
applauded for this technically superb book, which, after all, is not an
academic handbook, but a valuable guide on Africa.
Reviewed
by Willie Breytenbach, Emeritus Professor, Stellenbosch University
Available
at Timbooktoo tel 4494345.